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THE OBSCURE ORIGINS OF TRUE CONTRADICTIONS
Th e Obscure Origins of True 
Contradictions*
Demetrios Bastiras
Advances in modern logic have provided grounds for a review of 
Herakleitan fragments. Focusing on fragments that are indeed explic-
itly contradictory, we suggest that true contradictions play an impor-
tant part in Herakleitos’ theories. It turns out that this analysis is much 
simpler than the traditional modern alternatives and more faithful to 
the ancient interpretations of the fragments. Signiﬁ cantly, we can bet-
ter analyse Herakleitos’ theories ex post facto by using modern logical 
techniques. Herakleitos, nicknamed “Th e Obscure” for his style of writ-
ing (full of puns and hidden meanings) may thus be better understood 
as the ﬁ rst philosopher to believe in true contradictions. It seems that 
modern logic has found the key to unlock some of the Herakleitan 
riddles. 
Introduction
Many debates in the modern philosophy of logic have their origins 
in ancient Greece. Th is essay will focus on the origins of one of these 
debates, namely whether sentences are true or false or something else.
Th is debate is very important, since the semantic theory of logical 
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validity rests on notions of sentential truth and falsehood. Regarding 
sentential truth and falsehood, two positions will be mentioned here: 
on the one hand the consistentist logicians (such as Frege and Russell) 
argue that sentences are either true or false, not both true and false and 
not neither true nor false. Alternatively, the dialetheist logicians such as 
Priest and Routley argue that some sentences are both true and false. 
It turns out that diﬀ erent types of logics can be developed from the 
diﬀ erent semantic interpretation of sentences. If this debate remains 
unresolved, the question of which logic best represents the notion of 
validity remains unresolved. 
Th e consistentist position is that all contradictions are false. 
Traditionally, the consistentists have stamped their view on contra-
diction by formulating the traditionally named Law of Contradiction 
which states “It is not the case that both A and not A”. In this paper, 
in accordance with recent usage, the Law of Contradiction will be 
referred to as the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). For the consist-
entist, a contradiction destroys a theory. Th e consistentists take LNC 
quite seriously: Archbishop Th omas Cranmer said of contradictions 
“You shall never be good logician, that would set together two con-
tradictories: for that, the schoolmen say, God cannot do.” (Little, et al. 
1973: see Contradiction).
Th e implication of the modern dialethist position is that there are 
some true contradictions. Clearly, the general validity of LNC is denied 
by the dialetheist. Graham Priest in In Contradiction cites the semantic 
paradoxes, amongst others, as examples of true contradictions. Th e 
semantic paradoxes include such famous examples as the ancient 
Greek Liar paradox “I now speak falsely” attributed to the Megarian 
logician, Eubulides (400 BCE). If this sentence is true, then it is false. If 
it is false, then it is true. So it is both true and false. Th e Liar paradox is 
an apparently sound argument which has been philosophically scruti-
nised for more than two millennia: there is still no general consensus 
as to what is wrong with the argument, if anything is wrong at all. A 
dialetheist is also committed to the thesis that there are true contradic-
tions in the world. Th e ontological argument appeals to possible incon-
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sistency in sub-atomic physics, and also to the analysis of motion as 
inherently inconsistent. Note that for the dialetheist, a contradiction 
does not necessarily destroy a theory. For more dialethic logical detail 
see Priest (1987:219–41). 
Th e modern debate has an ancient parallel; in fact, that the ancient 
Greeks disputed about the problem of sentential truth and falsehood 
has been well-established (Kneale and Kneale, 1962:16). For example, 
the anonymous Megarian text Δισσοι Λόγοι (Dissoi Logoi) is very inter-
esting. Th e fourth antinomy in Dissoi Logoi argues that it is possible to 
uphold either side of a contradiction about true and false discourse. In 
the thesis the author “proves” that true and false discourse are identical 
by quoting the sentence “I am an initiate”. Th is sentence is true when 
spoken by person A, but false when spoken by person B. Th e earliest 
Dissoi Logoi dates back to is 400 BCE. 
Aristotle (384 BCE), in his Metaphysics, claimed that LNC is “the 
ﬁ rmest of all principles”. Eubulides responded with the Liar paradox: 
if all contradictions are false, what about the sentence “this sentence 
is false”? Chrysippus (281 BCE), a consistentist logician, wrote a text 
(now lost) titled “On those who think the same sentence to be both 
true and false” (Priest and Routley, 1989:5), which indicates that true 
contradictions were taken seriously by some ancient philosophers.
Th e standard view held by most scholars is that Parmenides was 
the earliest consistentist (ﬂ . 500 BCE). But discovering the earliest 
dialetheist is controversial. I will argue that Herakleitos of Ephesus 
(600 BC) was the ﬁ rst dialetheist. Th ere are three schools of thought 
on the matter.
1. Most ancient commentators asserted that Herakleitos was in-
consistent and consequently confused. Aristotle certainly ar-
gued for this position. 
2. Modern consistentists Russell and Kirk argue that Herakleitos 
was only superﬁ cially inconsistent. According to them, if the 
“correct” rational reconstruction is given it will be seen that 
Herakleitos was a consistentist aft er all. 
Bastiras, Demetrios 2005. The Obscure Origins of True Contradictions. In E. Close, M. Tsianikas and G. Frazis 
(eds.) "Greek Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Biennial International Conference of Greek Studies, 
Flinders University April 2003", Flinders University Department of Languages - Modern Greek: Adelaide, 53-64.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
56
DEMETRIOS BASTIRAS
3. Modern dialetheists agree with the ancient commentators that 
Herakleitos was inconsistent but do not think Herakleitos was 
confused. If this third position is correct, then Herakleitos was 
the originator of dialetheism. Th e aim of the present paper is to 
review the arguments for and against these three positions. It 
will be argued that Herakleitos was indeed the ﬁ rst dialetheist. 
Th e Herakleitan fragments
Herakleitos is diﬃ  cult to interpret. Barnes in Early Greek Philosophy 
asserts that no general consensus has been achieved on the following 
issues:
1. Translating the Greek into English. Herakleitos uses word play 
and puns in almost all his fragments, and most if not all of the 
eﬀ ect of the Greek words is lost in translation. 
2. Arrangement of the fragments. All interpretations of Herakleitos’ 
thought have proved controversial. From arbitrary ordering to 
controversial opinionated ordering, the fragments are still the 
source of much controversy. Th e interpretation of the fragments 
in this paper is bound to be controversial to some philosopher.
Th e three fragment types this paper will focus on are usually referred 
to as the Logos fragments, the Unity of Opposites fragments (which is 
a subset of the Logos fragments), and the Flux fragments. Th e source 
of the fragments in this paper is Barnes’ Early Greek Philosophy.
Th e Logos fragments argue for the natural connection of all things. 
For example fragment B94 “Just as [the principle of the Logos] alter-
nately makes the world from itself and again itself from the world. All 
things, Herakleitos says, are an exchange for ﬁ re and ﬁ re for all things, 
as goods for gold and gold for goods.” (Barnes, 2001:60). On the face 
of it, this does not imply that all things are identical, but merely that 
all things are connected. Th is consistentist interpretation on the Logos 
has the majority support of scholars on Herakleitos, both ancient and 
modern. I return to this later. 
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In contrast, the Unity of Opposites suggests a genuine identity 
between opposites. Th is is best represented by the fragment B60 “Th e 
path up and down is the same” (Barnes, 2001:51). Th e Unity of Opposites 
as an identity of some opposites is widely endorsed by the ancient phi-
losophers such as Parmenides, Aristotle, Simplicius, Hippolytus and 
Sextus Empiricus, but also by dialetheists such as Hegel, Priest and 
Routley. Most modern consistentist Herakleitan scholars (Kirk, Russell) 
do not accept this interpretation of the Unity of Opposites. 
Th e Flux fragments are best represented by the fragment type B49a 
“We step and do not step into the same rivers” (Barnes, 2001:70). Some, 
for example Priest, argue that the Flux is best seen as dialetheist. Priest 
maintains the Flux is a version of his own and Hegel’s theory that 
motion is inconsistent. Again, some of the ancient commentators seem 
to agree with the paraconsistent interpretation. Modern consistentists 
disagree, and attempt to interpret this fragment type as consistent.
Herakleitos as inconsistent and confused
Indications on inconsistency in Herakleitos are found amongst most 
of the ancient commentators. Parmenides the Eleatic (540 BCE) is 
the ﬁ rst philosopher to implicitly refer to Herakleitos as inconsistent. 
However, Parmenides was thoroughly consistentist; so in his view, 
Herakleitos was reduced to error and falsehood. Firstly let us establish 
the Parmenidean consistency assumptions. LNC is established early in 
Th e Way of Truth: 
But come, I will tell you —preserve the account when you 
 hear it— 
the only roads of inquiry there are to think of:
one, that it is and that it cannot not be
is the path of persuasion (for truth accompanies it); …
        (Barnes, 2001:80)
Truth accompanying the principle that it is and that it cannot not be 
is evidently equivalent to the Law of Non Contradiction. Parmenides’ 
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assertion rules out the possibility of contradiction, since there is no 
option for “it is and it is not”. Parmenides then states another form of 
LNC, that contradictories are not true together in the following frag-
ment:
For it can be, 
And nothing cannot. Th is I bid you ponder.
For from this road of inquiry <I bar> you [B 6.1-3], 
<he adds>
and then from the road along which mortals who know
 nothing
wander, two-headed; for impotence in their 
breasts guides their erring thought. And they carried along
both deaf and blind, bewildered, undiscerning crowds, 
by whom to be and not to be are deemed the same
and not the same; and the path of all turns back on itself.
 [B 6.4–9]
                   (Barnes, 2001:81)
According to Parmenides, those for whom to be and not to be are 
deemed the same are wrong. An inconsistent theory implies erring 
thought, impotent soul, unwillingness to listen to reason, unwilling-
ness to see evidence! A brutal deduction indeed, surpassed in trucu-
lence only by the modern consistentists. Clearly, Parmenides is a con-
sistentist philosopher. 
In Th e Cosmic Fragments, Kirk argues that the fragment B 6.4–9 
implicitly refers to Herakleitos, and references to the inconsistent 
philosophers and to the path do seem to conﬁ rm this. If so, we would 
at least have established that Parmenides’ view was that Herakleitos 
is inconsistent. Also, according to Parmenides’ own consistentist 
assumptions, Herakleitos’ theory is false. Obviously, this accusation 
need not a priori aﬀ ect a Herakleitan, because a Herakleitan will not 
agree with the Parmenidean consistency assumptions. Kirk argues 
that it is likely that Parmenides’ theoretical attack on those who iden-
tify opposites refers to Herakleitos (Kirk, 1954:2). “Th e path of all 
turns back on itself ” refers to the Herakleitan fragment B60 “Th e path 
up and down is the same” (Kirk, 1954:211). Th erefore, Parmenides 
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implicitly views Herakleitos as inconsistent, and wrong. 
Aristotle is famous for his opinion that LNC is the ﬁ rmest of all 
principles (Bochenski, 1951:38). Aristotle clearly thought Herakleitos 
was inconsistent. Not surprisingly, Aristotle thought Herakleitos’ 
theory was false because it was inconsistent. Regarding the incon-
sistency of Herakleitos, in the Topics Aristotle outlines the rules of 
engagement when defending a thesis in argument:
Th at is why those who introduce others’ opinions — for example good and 
evil are the same thing, as Herakleitos says — refuse to admit that contra-
ries do not belong at the same time to the same thing; not because they do 
not themselves believe this, but because on Herakleitos’ principles one has 
to say so. Th e same thing is done also by those who take on the defence of 
another’s thesis; their aim being to speak as would the man who stated the 
thesis (Barnes, 1984:269).
In Aristotle’s Metaphysics Γ, 1012a24, Herakleitos’ denial of LNC is ex-
plicitly stated again: the reason Herakleitos denied LNC is that since it 
is the case that some opposites are identical, then it is not the case that 
LNC is true. Ancient commentators such as Hippolytus (Barnes, 2001:
51), Simplicius (Kirk, 1954:94) and Herakleitos (not the Ephesian, but 
the historian) (Barnes, 2004:70) also conﬁ rm the identity of some op-
posites in Herakleitos’ theory. 
Sextus Empiricus is another one of the ancient sources suggesting 
that Herakleitos did believe in contradictions actually existing, hence 
denying LNC: 
It is true that Aenesidemus and his followers used to say the Sceptic Way 
is a road leading up to Herakleitan philosophy, since to hold that the same 
thing is the subject of appearances is a preliminary to holding that it is the 
subject of opposite realities. And while the Sceptics say that the same thing 
is subject of opposite appearances, the Herakleitans go on from this to assert 
their reality (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism: I, XXIX 210–13).
So, the sceptic view that the same thing apparently possesses opposite 
attributes or qualities is regarded as similar but not as dogmatically 
extreme as the Herakleitan view that it really possesses such qualities. 
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Sextus argues that honey appears to be sweet to a healthy person, bit-
ter to some people who are ill. We can infer from the previous sceptic 
argument therefore that the Herakleitans must have thought that 
honey actually was in essence both bitter and sweet at the same time.
Th ese ancient commentators support the natural interpretation 
that Herakleitos denied LNC, but they conclude too hastily that deny-
ing LNC implies Herakleitos’ theories were absurd in consequence of 
the contradictions. 
Herakleitos as consistent
According to the consistentists, it is unreasonable to argue for true 
contradictions in Herakleitos for two main reasons: (1) for the consist-
entists, any interpretation of the Unity of Opposites as an identity of 
opposites is mistaken. Th erefore, according to the consistentists, many 
ancient commentators on Herakleitos were mistaken to interpret the 
Unity of Opposites as an identity of opposites; and (2) since it is pos-
sible to rationally reconstruct the fragments within a consistentist 
framework, the consistentists argue it is not necessary to interpret the 
fragments as dialetheist. Kirk in Th e Cosmic Fragments and Russell in 
History of Western Philosophy argue that Herakleitos was only incon-
sistent in the way he chose to write, whereas what he meant should 
be interpreted as consistentist. At most, argue the consistentists, 
Herakleitos can be accused of being misleading for writing in riddles 
and puns.
Th e consistent interpretation of the fragments concerned faces two 
main problems: ﬁ rstly, it goes against the testimony of the ancients 
closest to Herakleitos; and secondly some major rational reconstruc-
tions of the meaning of the fragments are required to eliminate the 
inconsistencies. 
Instead of accepting that Parmenides did refer to Herakleitos, 
Kirk attempts to cast doubt on whether Parmenides really did refer 
to Herakleitos at all (Kirk, 1954:13). Kirk also asserts that Aristotle 
was wrong: he was a bad historian of ideas (Kirk, 1954:xi), and that 
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Simplicius and Hippolytus were wrong too, since they probably fol-
lowed Aristotle’s interpretation (Kirk, 1954:94). Th e testimony of 
Sextus Empiricus on the Herakleitans (quoted above in this paper) is 
not even mentioned by Kirk in Th e Cosmic Fragments. 
Herakleitos was not confused (read inconsistent), according to the 
consistentists, and Herakleitos did not intend to argue for opposites 
that are identical. Russell and Kirk agree that the Logos is a theory 
of connection in nature, but contend that the Unity of Opposites 
does not imply that some contradictions are identical. Instead, the 
“connection” meaning of the Logos is said to be the key to the mean-
ing of united opposites: some opposites are merely connected, not 
identical. Several examples are given. For instance, Russell (1957:63) 
argues that the Unity of Opposites is one of a balanced adjustment of 
opposing tendencies, not actually contradictory. Behind the apparent 
strife between opposites, there lies a hidden harmony or attunement, 
which is the world. Russell agrees that this appears to conﬂ ict with the 
fragment type “we step and do not step” and the even more contradic-
tory fragments “we are and we are not”, and “the upward path and the 
downward path is the same”. Both Russell and Kirk reconcile the prima 
facie inconsistent fragments by arguing that the sloping road allows 
the potential for both up and down, what matters most is the way 
you chose to travel: up or down, not both up and down at the same 
time (Kirk, 1954:211). In this interpretation, “up” is merely relative to 
that which is “down”. A consistent situation can appear to have con-
ﬂ icting features, but these features are not contradictory (Kirk, 1954:
94). Th us, Russell argues, just as one could not conceive of an upward 
path without a downward path, so no one could conceive a concept of 
good without a concept of evil, that is the world is full of consistent yet 
opposing but not contradictory forces (Russell, 1957:62). 
Herakleitos as dialetheist
Recent developments in modern logic have shown that inconsistency 
does not necessarily imply absurdity. Th e meaning of a logic is altered 
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by semantic adjustments: in dialethic logic, sentences can be either 
true or false, or both true and false. Th e inventors of dialethic logic, 
Graham Priest and Richard Routley, have argued that Herakleitos was 
the ﬁ rst dialetheist (as did Hegel). Priest and Routley agree that the 
Herakleitan Logos fragments refer to physical connection, not contra-
diction (Priest and Routley, 1989:6), and that the Unity of Opposites 
is where contradiction is to be found:
Th e principle truth of the Logos, that everything is united, is supported 
by, but of course not entailed by, the Unity of Opposites. It is part of the 
weaker theme, that some opposites are not merely connected but identical, 
a theme that suﬃ  ces for dialethism given only familiar assumptions (Priest 
and Routley, 1989:6). 
Th e argument that identical opposites, which actually exist, imply true 
contradictions goes as follows:
1. “Th e path up and down is the same” is equivalent to “Th e path 
up and the negation of the path up is the same” (Interpretation 
of Herakleitos according Parmenides, Aristotle, Simplicius, 
Hippolytus, Sextus Empiricus, Hegel, Priest, Routley);
2. Replace “path up” and “the negation of the path up” with A and 
~A respectively (modern logical replacement of line 1, where ‘~’ 
is the logical connective for negation.);
3. A is equivalent to ~A (Th e logical identity of A and ~A from line 2);
4. Conclusion: A and ~A (Using basic deductive rules of logic).
If the premises are true, and according to Herakleitos they are, then 
the conclusion is true also: thus we have a true contradiction. In agree-
ment with ancient consistentists from Parmenides on, Herakleitos is 
found to be inconsistent by the dialetheist logicians, but this time 
with very diﬀ erent implications. Th e theory is inconsistent but not 
absurd, since Herakleitos did not think all contradictions are true, but 
only that some were true. 
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In chapter 11 of In Contradiction, Priest argues for motion as 
inconsistent. Th is theory, Priest and Hegel argue, originates with the 
Herakleitan Flux fragments. For Priest, motion is a change of position. 
At any given instant a moving object is at position A because it has just 
reached position A. However, the moving object is also not at position 
A, since it is not stationary but moving away from position A. Th is is 
what Herakleitos meant in the Flux fragment “In the same river, we 
step and do not step, we are and we are not”. 
Given that Herakleitos ﬂ ourished around 500 BC, he is dated 
ahead of the closest ancient dialetheist, the author of the Dissoi 
Logoi. So Herakleitos is the ﬁ rst dialetheist in Greek history 
(Priest, Routley, 1980:5). Since the consistentists do not diﬀ erenti-
ate between the Logos and the Unity of Opposites in implication, 
one wonders why one should distinguish between the Logos 
and Unity of Opposites at all. Th e ancient commentators and 
the paraconsistentists do indeed allow for a diﬀ erence between 
the fragment types. Since the consistentist interpretation goes 
against the grain of the ancients, and being less natural it requires 
more rational reconstruction, it is not the best way to interpret 
Herakleitos.
Conclusion
We have seen that consistentists have interpreted Herakleitos in one 
of two ways: ancient commentators tended to see him as inconsistent 
and confused, whereas some recent commentators have seen him as 
consistent though misleading. Both interpretations suﬀ er from an ig-
norance of the resources that recent logic has discovered. Th is refutes 
the former charge of confusion, in particular. Th e latter objection 
requires that a less natural interpretation be placed on Herakleitos’ 
actual words, against the understanding of both the ancient consisten-
tists and the modern dialetheists. It would appear, then, that the most 
reasonable position to take is that Herakleitos was indeed the ﬁ rst 
dialetheist. 
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